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In order to improve business practices within the Department of the Navy, an
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of optimizing the schoolhouse and its
effects upon recruiting, recruit training, and the fleet is currently underway. As part
of this analysis, this thesis examines if there is an optimal recruiting pattern within
both the Navy and the Marine Corps based upon historical data. With a data base
consisting of 23,590 enlistment records, standard statistical and quantitative methods
are used to analyze DEP attrition, first-term attrition, and reenlistment rates.
Additionally, the monthly cost per recruit is analyzed for four functional cost areas
for the Navy area and Marine Corps district recruiting levels.
Major findings are: the longer a poolee remains in the DEP, the more likely the
poolee will attrit from the DEP. Poolees who survive the DEP, however, are more
likely to complete their first-term of enlistment as their time in-DEP increases. As
time in-DEP increases, a Navy poolee is less likely to reenlist; in the Marine Corps,
a poolee is more likely to reenlist. For both the Navy and Marine Corps, the highest
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Table 1 DATA BASE BREAKDOWN (DEP CONTRACTS FY 1989- 1991) 7





Within the Department of the Navy (DON), the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) is the
primary vehicle for accessing new recruits into both the Navy and Marine Corps.
Applicants are contracted into the DEP for a fixed period of time, ranging from 30 to 365
days. While in the DEP, new recruits are referred to as DEP'ers or poolees. Those
recruits who ship to recruit training in less than 30 days are referred to as direct shippers
or directs.
The DEP is a key ingredient in both service's recruiting practices, benefiting both the
services and the applicant. The services benefit by more efficiently scheduling follow-on
training, since they have more time to find qualified applicants. On the other hand,
applicants benefit by finding the type ofjob training they desire.
Both the Navy and Marine Corps experience large fluctuations in the monthly number
of recruits reporting to recruit training. This reflects a recruiting cycle that is driven by
graduating high school seniors. This group makes up over 50 percent of annual Navy and
Marine Corps accessions. Monthly accessions peak during the summer months, after high
school graduation, when the primary recruiting population is at its maximum. Conversely,
accessions are lowest during the spring months. The primary population is significantly
less, making recruiting more difficult.
The monthly accession profile of enlisted students reporting to recruit training reflects
a variety of factors, including fleet and personnel needs, budgetary constraints, and the
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size of the training establishment. Studies on accession profiles primarily focus on the
level loading of monthly accessions ~ accessing a constant monthly volume of recruits into
the respective service. A level load accession profile has appeal. Without any peak
accession months, the service's can minimize training infrastructures. However, both the
Navy and Marine Corps have accessed varying recruit cohorts each month of the year.
The Navy has never executed an accession profile that was within 20 percent of a level
load [Ref 1]; the Marine Corps has had about a 15 percent variation in phasing from
month to month [Ref.2].
B. OBJECTIVES/RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In an effort to improve business practices within the DON, the Organization
Management and Infrastructure Team is analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of
attempting to optimize the schoolhouse and its effects upon recruiting, recruit training,
and the fleet. In the recruiting business, however, it is believed that level loading the
schoolhouse reduces both recruiting efficiency and effectiveness. This research will
analyze if there is an optimal enlisted recruiting pattern based upon historical enlistment
data. To determine if there is an optimal enlisted recruiting pattern, this research will:
1
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Examine variance between contract signing and shipping date by month of the year.
2. Examine the effect the length of delay in the DEP has on DEP attrition and the
causes for failure to report to recruit training.
3. Determine if there is a correlation between time in the DEP and both completion of
enlistment and reenlistment.
4. Determine the monthly cost per recruit for different recruiting expenses.
C. LITERATURE REVIEW
Both the Navy and the Marine Corps began studying DEP and first-term attrition
during the late 1980s. The primary analysis of attrition for both service's has been
conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA). In 1986, Quester and Murray at
CNA found that certain shipping months significantly affected DEP attrition in the Navy.
They concluded that poolees scheduled to ship during May were more likely to attrite than
those scheduled to ship during October. A possible explanation for the
month-of-shipment differences being the availability of desired follow-on training
opportunities for October shippers.
In 1989, research conducted by Cooke and Quester at CNA, revealed that high school
diploma graduate (HSDG) recruits, who enter the Navy through the DEP, have greater
success adapting to life in the Navy than do other recruits. Having realized this differential
success, they report that the Navy's current accessions are more likely than ever to enter
from the DEP as HSDGs.
In the following year (1989), Cooke and Quester (CNA) conducted research on Navy
first-term attrition. Their research revealed that first-term attrition in the Navy was up,
with the sharpest increases in very early attrition. Attrition rates after the first few months
of service, however, increased as well. Additionally, they reported that non-HSDGs and
individuals who ship within a month of signing their enlistment contract (direct shippers)
have significantly higher attrition rates than HSDGs or accessions from the DEP.
In 1990, Kimble, North and Quester at CNA conducted research to identify successful
Marine Corps recruits. They found that HSDG accessions, certificate accessions over the
age of 20 years, Armed Force Qualification Test (AFQT) categories I-IIIA accessions,
accessions from the DEP, and accessions who met the in-service weight standards for their
height are most likely to adapt successfully to Marine Corps life.
In 1991, Cooke and Pflaumer at CNA reviewed DEP attrition, including research on
the relationship between time-in-DEP and first-term attrition. Their research revealed that
first-term attrition is inversely related to the time spent in the DEP. Thus, increasing the
time poolees spend in the DEP lowers their first-term attrition rate.
Also in 1991, Quester at CNA conducted research on first-term attrition in the Marine
Corps. She states that first-term non-end of active duty service (EAS) attrition appears to
be increasing and that the Corps has not translated its improved accession quality into
reduced attrition. The percentage ofMarines currently leaving the Corps before EAS is
about the same as it was during the early 1980s, when recruit quality was considerably
poorer. Using the results from several previous analysis, she also found non-EAS attrition
to be higher for recruits who are non-HSDGs, score lower on the AFQT, do not access
through the DEP, and do not meet the retention height/weight standard.
In summary, previous research has shown that increasing time-in-DEP increases the
likelihood of attriting from the DEP, but lowers the likelihood of attriting during the
first-term.
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis covers only regular component enlistments for both the Navy and Marine
Corps for those recruits contracted during fiscal years 1989-1991 . Data from this period
covers a recruit from contract through reenlistment. Additionally, neither the Navy or
Marine Corps recruiting commands keep detailed monthly financial records of all
activities. What obligations and expenditures they do track are fairly different. Both
recruiting commands had reservations about divulging financial data, fearing that this
research could warrant a future budget mark. Therefore, the financial analysis is restricted
to the best information available. The best information available includes the Navy area
and Marine Corps district obligation records over the past two fiscal years, 1996 and
1997.
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The next chapter describes methodology and the data provided by the Defense
Manpower Data Center West and both the Navy and Marine Corps Recruiting
Commands. Data is analyzed and interpreted in Chapter III. Conclusions and
recommendations are given in the final chapter.

H. DESCRIPTION OF DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. ENLISTMENT RECORDS
A total of 23,590 records were provided by the Defense Data Management Center
West for this study. The records were drawn from three separate MEPCOM data bases
and converted to an Excel spreadsheet. The data tracks a recruit from contract to
reenlistment. With this data, standard statistical and quantitative methods were used to
analyze DEP attrition, first-term attrition, and reenlistment rates for both the Navy and
Marine Corps. Table I summarizes the data base used for the analysis.
Table I Data Base Breakdown (DEP Contracts FY 1989-1991)






Attrition Type Navy DEP 2,034
Marine Corps DEP 2,557
Navy Before 1st Term 3,575
Marine Corps Before 1 st Term 2,449
Reenlistment Navy 1,785
Marine Corps 561
After analyzing DEP attrition, 2,598 records had to be eliminated because the
first-term of enlistment and reenlistment data was not resident. This required eliminating
8 1 5 Navy records and 1,783 Marine Corps records. The data base includes only regular
non-prior service contracts for fiscal years 1989 through 1991.
Table II describes the factors used to analyze the data.
Table II Factors Analyzed
Factor Description Levels
Quality Education High School Diploma Grad
(HSDG) or Higher
AFQT Score I-IIIA (Score 50+)
Month of Actual month poolee sworn Ranges by FY from October to
Contract into the DEP September
Time in DEP Actual time spent in the DEP 1 to 12+ months
Attrition Type When attrition occurs 1. DEP Loss
2. 1st Term (At least one
year before EAS)




5. Failed to complete
High School
6. Pursue Higher Education
7. Component Transfer
Reenlistment Did reenlistment occur 1. Yes
2. No
B. FINANCIAL DATA
Financial reports for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 were provided by both the Navy and
Marine Corps Recruiting Commands. The Navy and Marine Corps Recruiting Commands
are organized differently; for the purpose of a financial analysis, the Navy's Recruiting
Area and the Marine Corps' Districts are treated equally. There are four Navy Area
Headquarters and six Marine Corps District Headquarters.
The Navy Recruiting Command (NRC) provided quarterly cumulative obligation
reports for their recruiting areas; the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC)
provided monthly cumulative obligation reports for their recruiting districts. To keep the
analysis equal, cumulative quarterly totals for each service are divided equally between the
respective months of the quarter. Additionally, both services track cost areas differently.
The four most uniform functional cost areas were analyzed at area/district level:
communications, vehicles, automated data processing (ADP), and advertising. To
determine the monthly cost per recruit for each functional cost area, regular component
gross contracts for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 were provided for each service by Defense
Data Management Center West. Additionally, each Recruiting Command provided a
Recruiting Resources Summary Report for fiscal years 1996 and 1997. They submit this
report bi-annually to the Secretary of Defense.
C. OPTIMAL RECRUITING PATTERN
With the data discussed in this chapter, optimal recruiting months for both the Navy
and Marine Corps are determined by combining quality shipping percentages by month of
contract and the combined cost per contract for the four selected functional cost areas.
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m. ANALYSIS OF DATA
A. DEP ATTRITION
Figure 1 compares DEP discharge rates between the Navy and the Marine Corps by
the month a poolee contracted. For fiscal years 1989-1991, DEP attrition reached
17.25% for the Navy and 21.44% for the Marines. Both services show monthly
fluctuations in percent attrition with higher discharge rates during the summer contracting
period. The Navy's DEP attrition decreases continuously from 16.9% in October to
13.3% in April, then continually increases to its maximum of 20.4% in July, and drops
slightly to 19.0% in September. On the other hand, the Marine Corps DEP attrition
appears to fluctuate seasonally for most of the year with seasonal peaks in November,
March, July, and a maximum peak of 26.7% in September. The November and March
seasonal peaks, however, are lower than the large attrition percentages found during June,
July, and August.
Figure 2 compares DEP discharge rates for both the Navy and Marine Corps by the
number of months a poolee is in the DEP. Both services show a continual increase in the
percentage of attrition for poolees that remain in the DEP from one to seven months.
There is a small dip in the eighth month attrition rate, with a slight but steady increase out
to the eleventh month, and a large spike in the twelfth month. For both services, the






















Figure 2 DEP Discharge Comparison by Months in DEP
Figure 3 shows the average time in DEP plus and minus one standard deviation for the
Navy and Figure 4 shows the same information for the Marine Corps. Both figures are










Figure 3 Navy Average Time in DEP with One Standard Deviation
The average time-in-DEP for the Navy was 4.98 months with a standard deviation of
3.44 months; the average for the Marines was 6.4 months with a standard deviation of
3 .84 months. Both services show lower averages during the spring season, due to
near-term shipping requirements; averages are higher during the summer because high
school seniors are contracted and scheduled to ship the following summer after high
school graduation. There are two possible reasons why the time-in-DEP differs between
the Navy and Marines: the availability of follow-on training spaces and/or the efforts to
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Figure 4 Marine Corps Average Time in DEP with One Standard Deviation
Figure 5 compares the percentage of contracts placed by months in the DEP for the
Navy and Marine Corps. The Navy's percentage of contracts placed is higher for the
near-term, one-to-seven months in the DEP, the Marines' percentage of contracts placed is
higher for the long-term, eight-to-twelve months in the DEP.
Figure 6 compares cumulative contract placements by months in the DEP for the Navy
and Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has poolees in the DEP longer than the Navy and
the cost to the Marines is a higher DEP attrition rate. These two figures suggest that the
Marine Corps' heavier reliance on other services for follow-on training reduces the
Marines follow-on training availability. Thus, the Marine Corps must emphasize pool
















Figure 6 Cumulative Contract Placement Comparison by Months in DEP
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This constraint may also have an effect upon DEP discharge quality. The percent of
quality contracts for the Navy and Marine Corps are almost the same: 56.07% for the
Navy and 56.04% for the Marine Corps. Quality contracts shipped, however, are
somewhat higher for the Navy at 5 1.57%, than the Marine Corps, at 5 1 .06%. The Navy's
percentage of quality DEP discharges is .49% or half a percent lower than the Marines.
Figure 7 compares quality DEP discharges between the Navy and Marine Corps. This
figure shows the relationship between the overall DEP attrition rate and the quality DEP
attrition rate for both services. For the majority of the months in which a poolee was
contracted, the Marines' attrition rate for both overall DEP and quality DEP poolees met
or exceeded both the combined Navy and Marine Corps average DEP attrition rate of
19.5% and the quality DEP attrition rate of4.7%.
DEP Discharge














Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep
Month of Contract
FYs 1989-1991
Figure 7 DEP Discharge Quality Comparison by Month of Contract
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Figure 8 compares DEP discharges by reason for discharge for the Navy and the
Marine Corps during fiscal years 1989-1991. The percentage rates are not precise
because many discharge records are missing their discharge code. However, Figure 8
compares the seven most likely reasons based upon records with a discharge code. In
both services, the reason a poolee is most likely to discharge is for Refusal to Enlist/Did
not Report. This percentage is 23. 1% for the Navy and 18.4% for the Marines. For the
Navy, the next most common reasons to attrit from the DEP was a failure to graduate
high school, 14.9%, and medical disqualification, 14.1%. For the Marine Corps, the next
most common reasons to attrite from the DEP was medical disqualification, 12.0%, and
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Figure 8 DEP Discharge Comparison by Reason for Discharge
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B. COMPLETION OF FIRST TERM ENLISTMENT AND REENLISTMENT
1. Completion of First-term
Figure 9 compares Navy and Marine Corps DEP'ers completing their first-term of
enlistment, by the number of months spent in the DEP. The percentage ofNavy DEP'ers
who complete their first-term of enlistment is 52.2%, while 61.1% complete their
first-term in the Marine Corps. The percentage ofDEP'ers who complete their first-term
of enlistment fluctuates somewhat based upon the number of months in the DEP. In
general, both services show a decreasing trend: the percentage of those who complete
their first-term of enlistment decrease as poolees increase their time in the DEP out to
twelve months.
Comparison of DEP'ers
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Figure 9 Comparison of DEP'ers Who Complete First-term of Enlistment
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Figure 10 compares Navy and Marine Corps DEP'ers who complete their
first-term of enlistment by the month the poolee was contracted. In the Marine Corps,
poolees who are contracted during the first quarter (October- December), are more likely
to complete their first-term of enlistment. In the Navy, poolees who are contracted during
October, December, February, and April are more likely to complete their first-term of
enlistment. Overall, poolees in both services who are contracted during the peak summer
months are less likely to complete their first-term of enlistment, largely due to their high
percentage ofDEP attrition.
Comparison of DEP'ers















Figure 10 Comparison of DEP'ers Who Complete First-term of Enlistment
Figure 1 1 compares Navy and Marine Corps shippers who complete their
first-term of enlistment, by the number of months the poolee spent in the DEP. The
average percentage of shippers who complete their first-term of enlistment is 6 1 .5% in the
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Navy and 71.5% in the Marine Corps. The percentage of shippers who complete their
first-term of enlistment fluctuates somewhat based upon the number of months in the
DEP, but both services show an increasing trend between those who complete their
first-term of enlistment and their time in the DEP. This indicates that the DEP acts as a
natural filter during the enlistment process. Overtime, those poolees who survive the
DEP, are more likely to complete their first-term of enlistment.
Comparison of Shippers









Figure 11 Comparison of Shippers Who Complete First-Term ofEnlistment
2. Reenlistment
Figure 12 compares Navy and Marine Corps DEP'ers who reenlist after their
first-term of enlistment, by the number of months a poolee spent in the DEP. The average
percentage of DEP'ers who reenlist is 16.3% in the Navy and 5.6% in the Marines. This is
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a fairly significant difference of over 1 0%, however, reenlistment rates depend upon the
number of spaces available for continued service. With a smaller force structure, the
Marine Corps reenlists fewer DEP'ers than the Navy. For both services, the percentage
of reenlistments fluctuates monthly. However, there is a difference across services. As
time in DEP increases for Navy poolees, the percentage who reenlist tends to decrease; in
the Marine Corps, as time in DEP increases, the percentage of poolees who reenlist
increases as shown in Figure 13. This trend indicates that Marine Corps poolees who stay
in the DEP for longer periods and ship to recruit training are more likely to reenlist.




Figure 12 Comparison of DEP'ers Who Reenlist by Months in DEP
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Figure 13 Comparison of DEP'ers Who Reenlist by Months in DEP
C. FINANCIAL
Figure 14 compares communications costs per contract between the Navy and Marine
Corps. The average Marine Corps district's communications cost per contract exceeds
the Navy area's cost per contract by $121, or 3 1%. Both services' communications costs
are highest in the graduate market contracting period, due to the low volume of February
through May contracts needed for near-term shipping requirements. Conversely, both
services' communications costs are lowest during the high volume, high school senior
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Figure 14 Communications Cost Comparison
Figure 1 5 compares vehicle costs per contract between the Navy areas and Marine
Corps districts. The average Marine Corps district's vehicle cost per contract is $14, or
8% higher than the Navy area's vehicle cost per contract. Again, both services' vehicle
costs are highest in the graduate market contracting period due to the low volume of
February through May contracts needed for near-term shipping requirements. Conversely,
both services' vehicle costs are lowest during the high volume, high school senior oriented








Figure 15 Vehicles Cost Comparison
Figure 16 compares ADP costs per contract between the Navy areas and Marine
Corps districts. The average Marine Corps district's ADP cost per contract is $28, or
39% higher than the Navy area's ADP cost per contract. The Navy area's cost per
contract are highest during the January, February, and March time period, while the
Marine Corps district's cost per contract is highest during the months of April, May, and
September. Both services ADP costs are influence by the low volume graduate market
contracting period, but the Marine Corps district's ADP costs also appear to be influenced
by end of the fiscal year spending. End of the year spending increases are likely used to
upgrade outdated computer systems. Both services ADP costs are lowest during the first
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Figure 16 ADP Cost Comparison
Figure 1 7 compares advertising cost per contract between the Navy areas and Marine
Corps districts. The average Navy area's advertising cost per contract is $1 16, or 69%
higher than the Marine Corps district's advertising cost per contract. The Navy area's
advertising costs are highest in the graduate market contracting period due to the low
volume of February through May contracts needed for near-term shipping requirements.
The Marine Corps district's advertising costs are highest during the first quarter of the
fiscal year, from October through December. The Marine Corps district's advertising
costs are high during the first quarter because they run commercial advertisements in
movie theaters during the holiday season. Both services' advertising costs are low during
the high volume, high school senior contracting period in June, July and August.
However, the Marine district's advertising costs per contract are low in January, February,
25
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Figure 17 Advertising Cost Comparison
D. OPTIMAL RECRUITING PATTERN
Figure 1 8 compares quality contracts for both the Navy and Marine Corps by month of
contract. The Navy contracts their highest percentage of quality recruits in June, July, and
August; the Marine Corps contracts their highest percentage of quality recruits in August,
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Figure 18 Quality Contract Comparison by Month of Contract
Figure 19 compares the combined cost per contract selected Navy and Marine Corps
functional area costs by month of contract. The Navy area's cost per contract is lowest in
July, August, and September; the Marine Corps district's cost per contract is lowest in
June, July, and August.
Figure 20 compares quality shipping for both the Navy and Marine Corps by month of
contract. The Navy ships their highest percentage of quality recruits in July, January,
April, August, and June, the Marine Corps ships their highest percentage of quality
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Figure 20 Quality Shipping Comparison by Month of Contract
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Based upon Figures 18 and 19, the optimal recruiting pattern for the Navy appears to
be the high quality and low cost per contract months of June, July, and August. For the
Marine Corps, the optimal pattern appears to be split between two separate two month
periods: December to January and July to August. What is most important to both
services, however, is not the quality of contracts, but the quality of contracts who ship to
recruit training. For example, Figure 7 previously revealed that the Navy's DEP attrition
rate for quality contracts spikes to a high of 9.9% during June. Only by comparing
quality shipping, as shown in Figure 20, with cost per contract, as shown in Figure 19, can
the optimal recruiting months be determined. For the Navy, the highest quality, least cost
shippers are contracted during July, August, and January; for the Marine Corps, the




IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This research attempted to determine if there is an optimal enlisted recruiting pattern




Is there variance between contract signing and shipping date by month of the year?
2. What effect does the length of delay in the DEP have on DEP attrition and what
are the causes for failure to report to recruit training?
3. Is there a correlation between time in the DEP and both completion of enlistment
and reenlistment?
4. What is the monthly cost per recruit for different recruiting expenses?
Contract signing and shipping month do vary for both the Navy and Marine Corps.
The variance between contract signing and shipping month is smallest from February
through May and largest from June through August. A Navy recruit's average time in
DEP is 4.98 months, with a 3.44 month standard deviation; the Marine Corps recruit's
average time in DEP is longer at 6.4 months with a standard deviation of 3.84 months.
Additionally, comparing contract placement between both services by months in DEP
reveals that a higher percentage ofNavy poolees are in the DEP for a relatively short
period, one-to-seven months; for the Marines', a higher percentage of poolees are in the
DEP for a longer period, eight-to-twelve months.
Looking more closely at the length of delay in the DEP, the longer a poolee remains
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in the DEP, the more likely that the poolee will attrit from the DEP. This reflects the
higher attrition rates of predominately high school senior poolees who are contracted
during the summer months, June through August. Additionally, comparing DEP discharge
quality between services reveals that the Navy looses a half of a percent fewer quality
poolees than the Marine Corps. Finally, the most likely reason for DEP attrition for both
services is refusal to enlist, followed by failure to complete high school for Navy poolees
and medical reasons for Marine Corps poolees.
Analyzing DEP'ers reveals that both contract signing and delay in starting recruit
training are correlated with completion of enlistment and reenlistment. For both services,
the percentage of poolees completing their first-term of enlistment decreases as their time
in the DEP increases. Again, this reflects the higher attrition rates of predominately high
school senior poolees who are contracted during the summer months. This is not the case,
however, for poolees who survive the DEP. Poolees who survive the DEP, are more
likely to complete their first-term of enlistment as time in DEP increases. The DEP
apparently acts as natural filter during the enlistment process; overtime, those poolees who
survive the DEP, are more likely to complete their first-term of enlistment. Analyzing
DEP'ers reenlistment rates for both services reveals different trends as time in the DEP
increases. For the Navy, as time in the DEP increases, a poolee is less likely to reenlist; in
the Marine Corps, the longer a poolee is in the DEP, the more likely the poolee will
reenlist.
The monthly cost per recruit varies across different categories of recruiting expenses.
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The categories analyzed include communications, vehicles, automated data processing
(ADP), and advertising at the Navy area and Marine Corps district recruiting levels.
For both services, communications and vehicle costs per contract are highest in the
spring. This reflects the low volume of graduate market contracts needed to make
near-term shipping requirements. Communications and vehicle costs per contract are
lowest during the high volume, high school senior oriented summer market. The Navy
area's ADP costs per contract are highest between January and March; the Marine Corps
district's ADP costs per contract are highest during the months of April, May, and
September. Both services' ADP costs are influenced by the low volume graduate market
contracting period, but the Marine Corps district's cost per contract, is also influenced by
end of the fiscal year spending. For advertising costs per contract, the Navy area's costs
are highest during the low volume, spring graduate market contracting period; the Marine
Corps district's costs are highest during the fall due to holiday season commercial
advertisements.
Optimal monthly recruiting periods should balance the percent of quality shippers and
the overall monthly cost per contract. For both the Navy and Marine Corps, the highest
quality shippers, per contract cost, occur during the months of July, August, and January.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
This research analyzed optimal enlisted recruiting patterns based upon historical
enlistment data. Based upon the results of this research, I can only recommend that both
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the Navy and Marine Corps continue to follow current enlistment polices and procedures.
Recommendations to modify policies or procedures can not be tendered without
adequately analyzing their potential impacts upon the current recruiting cycle. Further
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